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This study analyzes the determinants of land tenure insecurity and its impact on 
intensity of use of purchased farm inputs among households in Southern Ethiopia. 
Seventeen percent of the households stated that they were tenure insecure. The feeling of 
tenure insecurity could be caused by the land redistribution policy in Ethiopia where 
household size has been the main criterion used for land allocation after the land reform 
in 1975. This would imply that land rich households should be more tenure insecure. 
Alternatively, the local power structure may be strong enough to counter this and cause 
the land rich, who are also likely to be influential, to be able to protect their land rights. 
The analysis revealed that, in the overall sample, relative farm size was not significantly 
correlated with tenure insecurity. When testing for each site, however, we found that in 
four of the sites per capita farm size was positively associated with tenure insecurity, 
while in five other sites it had a significant negative association. This may be due to local 
historical, cultural, and demographic differences giving way to differences in the effects 
of the redistribution policy and the local power structure on tenure insecurity.  
 
We assessed the impact of tenure insecurity on the intensity of use of purchased 
farm inputs. The tenure insecurity variable was insignificant. Farmers in areas with a 
positive correlation between farm size and tenure insecurity were more likely to purchase 
farm inputs. Larger farms were more likely to use purchased inputs, but this effect was 
lower in areas with a positive correlation between farm size and tenure insecurity. 
Poverty and subsistence constraints may explain this absence of higher intensity of use of 
purchased inputs on small farms. By contrast, the land redistribution policy may have 
improved small farms’ access to purchased farm inputs.   
 
Key words:  land redistribution, tenure insecurity, farm input intensity, resource poverty, 
Southern Ethiopia.  
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LAND REDISTRIBUTION, TENURE INSECURITY, 
AND INTENSITY OF PRODUCTION: 










The distribution of land resources is a central political economy question in many 
developing countries. Disputes over land have been the root cause of civil wars and 
revolutions, much so because land has been the primary means of generating livelihood 
for the overwhelming majority of the rural population in these countries (Deininger and 
Binswanger 1999; Deininger and Feder 1998). Furthermore, the way land tenure is 
instituted and the consequent perceptions and expectations of the land holders may 
directly affect the way farms are managed (Firmin-Sellers and Sellers 1999; Maxwell and 
Wiebe 1999; Sjaastad and Bromley 1997; Gavian and Ehui 1999; Place and Migot-
Adholla 1998; Li et al. 1998; Besley 1995; Platteau 1996; Alemu 1999) and this may 
have efficiency as well as sustainability consequences. 
In the land reform in Ethiopia in 1975 all land was appropriated by the state after 
the new military regime took over. Landlords lost their land rights and land was 
distributed to individual households with household size being the main criterion for land 
allocation (Rahmato 1994b; Ege 1990, 1994; Abegaz 1994; Pausewang 1988; Teferi 
1994; Alemu 1999; Yohannes 1994; Admassie 1995; Joireman 1994). As household sizes 
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change over time and new households appear, there was also a need to redistribute land at 
later stages to improve or maintain the egalitarian distribution and to provide land to new 
landless households. But how did this policy affect tenure insecurity? And has the land 
reform in Ethiopia eliminated the influence and power of the local elites? Or do the 
relatively land rich have the power to retain their land and therefore do not feel more 
tenure insecure? Given that the land policy has affected the level of tenure insecurity in 
Ethiopia, how does this affect the intensity of production of farm households? Alemu 
(1999) found that small farms invested more in land conservation than large farms in a 
sample of households from central and northern Ethiopia. He claimed that this lower 
investment on large farms was due to their higher level of tenure insecurity as they were 
more likely to lose land in future redistributions. An alternative hypothesis could be that 
small farms invest more on the land because land is scarcer and therefore more valuable 
(Boserup’s (1965) hypothesis). We address these issues by analyzing data from 500 
households in 15 different sites in southern Ethiopia. We find that the relationship 
between farm size and tenure insecurity is site-specific, and that the land redistribution 
policy, through its effect on tenure insecurity, has little impact on the intensity of use of 
purchased farm inputs, even in areas with a positive correlation between farm size and 
tenure insecurity. Larger farms were more likely to purchase farm inputs and to plant 
perennials, indicating that poverty and subsistence constraints may limit the ability of 
small farmers to intensify production by purchase of inputs or to invest in perennials. 
Tenure insecurity also appeared not to affect whether farmers planted perennial crops. 
The rest of the paper is arranged such that we present the theoretical approach in 




a description of the methodological approach. We then present the results and discussions 
in part 5 followed by the conclusion.   
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
Tenure insecurity is defined here as the perceived probability or likelihood of 
losing ownership of a part or the whole of one’s land without his/her consent (Sjaastad 
and Bromley 1997, Alemu 1999). The strength of this perception may have a bearing on 
how farmers manage their land and this in turn has an effect on agricultural production 
and sustenance of the people who directly depend on it. Many authors (Maxwell and 
Wiebe 1999; Alemu 1999; Deininger and Feder 1998; Li et al. 1998; Lawry 1994; 
Kidanu and Alemu 1994) have argued that tenure insecurity discourages investment on 
land by removing the incentives for it, as one may not be able to collect the expected flow 
of benefits of one’s efforts if there looms a threat of losing the land in the future. It is also 
possible that land tenure arrangements that assign land rights to the community or to 
landlords, rather than to the actual land users, may discourage long-term investment in 
land improvement (Hayami and Otsuka 1993).  
Through investment, farm households improve their productivity, leading to 
increased agricultural output and increased income and wealth level. By providing 
incentives for exerting non-observable extra efforts (Deininger and Feder 1998) and for 
use of purchased inputs, tenure security may also have an impact on productivity and 
farm output, even in the short-run.  
Knox McCulloch, Meinzen-Dick and Hazell (1998) emphasize how spatial and 
temporal characteristics of technologies have implications for the relevance of tenure 




importance if costs and benefits accrue in the short run than if the benefits accrue over a 
longer time period. We may therefore expect tenure insecurity to have more impact on 
decisions like tree planting, building of conservation structures or irrigation, than 
purchase of fertilizer, seeds and other inputs providing short-term returns. Our basic 
hypothesis is therefore that tenure insecurity has no impact on intensity of use of 
purchased farm inputs but that it has an impact on growing of perennials.  The fact that 
planting of perennials and other long-term production decisions play a role only in some 
farming systems, while annual crops and short-term production decisions totally 
dominate other farming systems, therefore may imply that tenure insecurity may only 
matter in farming systems where long-term production decisions are important.  
Gavian and Fafchamps (1996, p.461) found that “existing empirical studies have 
failed to establish strong links between land rights, investment, and agricultural 
productivity on African croplands.” They refer to only one unpublished study (Kille and 
Lyne 1993) that has succeeded in empirically linking tenure security to input use. Place 
and Hazell (1993) found that land rights (use rights or transfer rights) were not 
significantly related to yields in Ghana, Kenya and Rwanda. They also found no 
relationship between total costs of non-labor inputs and land rights in Ghana while there 
was a positive correlation between the incidence of some types of land improvement and 
land rights in Rwanda. Use of credit was also not significantly related to land rights. They 
concluded that lack of access to credit, insufficient human capital, and labor shortages 
adversely affected investment decisions more than insecurity of tenure. Barrow and Roth 
(1990) found no link between land title or land rights and land improvements in Kenya. 




scarce manure resources to more secure fields whenever they can, as they preferred to use 
manure on own rather than on borrowed fields. Fortmann et al. (1997), in a study of 
tenure security and gender differences in tree planting in Zimbabwe found that women 
were less likely to plant trees where they have less security of duration of tenure.  
Gavian and Ehui (1999) found in a study in Arsi in Ethiopia that informally 
contracted lands appeared to be farmed 10-16% less efficiently but that such lands 
actually received more, rather than less, inputs. They attributed the gap in factor 
productivity to differences in input quality or lack of skills in applying inputs. Another 
study of the same data (Pender and Fafchamps 2001), found no significant difference in 
input intensity or output value on own vs. sharecropped fields after having controlled for 
differences in village, household and plot characteristics.  
THE ETHIOPIAN LAND REFORM AND TENURE INSECURITY 
Proclamation 31, 1975, “Public Ownership of Rural Lands,” prohibited private 
ownership of land; transfers of land by sale, lease and mortgage; as well as hiring of 
labor. It acknowledged only use rights to land and set a maximum farm size of 10 
hectares. In this way absentee landlordism was eliminated and only owner cultivation 
became legal. The previous landlords could retain some land if they were willing to 
cultivate it themselves. They received no compensation for their losses and tenants were 
freed from all their obligations to their previous landlords.  
Land was distributed to households and family size was the main criterion for 
land allocation. Consideration of land quality, operational capacity, and previous land 
possession depend on local circumstances as the process of land redistribution was 




comprised an area of approximately 800 ha of land (Rahmato 1984).  Subsequent land 
redistributions served to improve upon the initial distribution and to allocate land to new 
persons who were eligible to receive land. The timing and frequency of such 
redistributions varied from locality to locality. This policy created a fear among those 
who had larger land areas, however, as there was a need to take land from them in order 
to have something to give to those with no or very little land (Ege 1997). 
As a consequence of this land policy, Alemu (1999) claims that the farm 
households’ tenure security in Ethiopia is inversely related to the farm size they hold 
(adjusted for household size) (Hypothesis 1).  
Determinants of Tenure Insecurity 
In this paper we provide a test of Alemu’s hypothesis that farm households with 
larger relative farm size feel more tenure insecure than those with relatively less land. 
This may also indicate the effect of Ethiopia’s land policy on farm household perceptions 
of tenure security.  
The perception of tenure insecurity as discussed above can be illustrated in a 
simple model as: 
N = N(R)                  (1) 
where N=1 when the household fears losing land, N=0 otherwise. If this fear is 
influenced by the relative farm size due to the land redistribution policy and R is relative 
farm size







                    (2) 
                                                 





An opposing scenario may also be envisaged. The local power structure may 
subvert the official policy
4, and the more powerful households may have succeeded in 
retaining more land. They may also feel confident that they can use their influence to 
keep their larger holdings even if new land redistributions were to take place, thus they 
feel more tenure secure (Hypothesis 2).  The model therefore becomes: 
N = f(R, P(R))                   (3) 
where P is the power of the household. In this case the relationship between farm size 
and tenure insecurity becomes ambiguous: 
¶N/¶R = ¶f/¶R + (¶f/¶P)(¶P/¶R)<>0             (4) 
If the second term dominates over the first term, the effect of the local power 
structure dominates the effect of the redistribution policy and we expect a negative sign, 
implying that larger farms feel more tenure secure. The net effect of the two may differ 
from locality to locality depending on the local historical, cultural, and demographic 
differences. Hence, in some localities the power structure may dominate and per capita 
land holding may be negatively associated with tenure insecurity, while in other locations 
local power structure may matter less and per capita land holding may be positively 
correlated with tenure insecurity.   
Another hypothesis on the interaction of land allocation policy and tenure 
insecurity arises from a stipulation that rural households must demonstrate farming 
capacity in order to retain their land. Households that fail to farm all their land 
                                                 
4 It appears that this hypothesis was behind the recent land redistribution exercise in the Amhara region of 
North-central Ethiopia. Rahmato (1984) also reported considerable cross-community variation in terms of 




themselves and instead rent out
5 part of or all their land may therefore feel less tenure 
secure (Hypothesis 3), even though short-term renting of land has become legal under the 
new constitution.   
Farm households with perennials are expected to feel less tenure insecure 
(Hypothesis 4), as perennial crops are often seen to strengthen claims to land and 
demonstrate continuous use (Sjaastad and Bromley 1997, Besley 1995).
6  
Household wealth variables and cash crop orientation may be signs of power and 
these may reduce tenure insecurity (Hypothesis 5). We have therefore included livestock 
holding and area share of cash crops in the model. Since there is overlap between cash 
crops and perennials, the perennial subsistence crop enset was kept as a separate variable 
and other perennials were included in the cash crop area.   
We summarize the model for determinants of tenure security as follows
7; 
N = f{R, DRO, Aprn, Ox, TLU, DS , Z
h}             (3) 
where, 
•  N = Perception of tenure insecurity of a household (dependent variable). If a 
household feels tenure insecurity, the variable takes the value of 1, and 0 
otherwise.  
•  R = Relative farm size. A positive sign is expected for the variable if the land 
redistribution policy causes tenure insecurity. 
                                                 
5 We define “renting” of land in a wide sense, including renting by fixed-rent as well as sharecropping 
arrangements. 
6 We have information from Tigray that planting of trees has been used to gain more secure rights to land 
(Hagos, pers. com.). 
7 For  testing on site by site basis, we use the same model except for replacing R with DFS*R. It allows us to 




•  DRO = Dummy variable, =1 for households renting out land through fixed rent or 
sharecropping arrangements. Positive sign expected.  
•  Aprn = Area share of perennials. Expected sign of the variable is negative. 
•  Ox = Oxen holding. Indicator of land operating capacity and wealth (power). A 
negative sign may be expected for the variable. 
•  TLU = Livestock holding, excluding oxen (in tropical livestock units). Livestock 
here is taken as a proxy for wealth, because it is considered to be a standing 
capital. It is to capture the effect of wealth and may be an indicator of social status 
and influence (power) of the household in the community. Expected sign is 
negative. 
•  DS = location dummy. Differing signs may be expected depending on local 
historical differences. 
•  DS*R = location specific relative per capita farm size. This variable tests whether 
tenure insecurity increases with farm size in each location. Different signs may be 






h = Household characteristics. In this category we have
8: 
•  Age of head of household (HHage), the sign of the variable may be 
positive if the old are losing their influence in the community and may feel 
more tenure insecure, or negative if they hold an influential position.  
•  Sex of the household head (HHsex). Female-headed households may have 
less influence in the community than their male counterparts and may feel 
more insecure about their tenure.  
•  Education level (Educ16th = number of household members with 
education up to grade 6, Educ6th = number of household members with 
education above grade 6). The higher the level of education, the more 
informed the household is likely to be about the recent land redistribution 
exercise in the Amhara region
9, which may have created fears that land 
would be redistributed elsewhere as well. We expect the variables to be 
positively correlated with tenure insecurity. 
Tenure Insecurity and Land Use Intensity  
In this section we look at the relationship between tenure insecurity and intensity 
of farm input use among the farm households in Southern Ethiopia. We explore if tenure 
insecurity negatively affects intensity of farm input use. We also look at the effect of land 
                                                 
8 We have left out household size (HHS) because we have already used the variable in converting 
household land holdings to per capita holdings and its effect is, therefore, already included in the model. 
9 This redistribution was quite extensive in the Amhara region and served to punish those who had been 




scarcity (population pressure) on farm input use, and see if per capita farm size and farm 
input use are inversely related.   
In a neo-classical economy with perfect markets input intensity would be 
independent of farm size and household characteristics, and so only land characteristics 
would matter. An inverse relationship between input intensity and farm size occurs due to 
imperfections in more than one market, of which markets for labor, credit, and security 
may be important (Heltberg 1998). And there are serious imperfections in rural factor 
markets in Southern Ethiopia. Holden and Yohannes (2000) found that the majority of 
households did not participate in markets for land and oxen, and a considerable 
proportion of households did not participate in labor and credit markets.   
Some households use no purchased farm inputs, making this variable censored at 
zero. This may be due to access problems, limited ability to buy, risk, and/or low 
profitability. It may also be most appropriate to look at this as two decisions. Households 
first decide whether to use or not to use purchased farm inputs and then, if they want or 
are able to use, they decide how much they are to use/purchase.   
We take the intensity of use of purchased farm inputs (such as seeds, fertilizer, 
pesticides and herbicides) per unit operated area as an indicator of land use intensity. We 
test whether farm input intensity is affected by tenure insecurity, either through the 
decision whether to use purchased input or not, and the decision on how much to use.  
We test this versus alternative hypotheses regarding determinants of intensity of 
production. For example, is it rather the land scarcity that is the real force behind the 
level of intensity of use of purchased farm inputs? We can also envisage that both factors 




I = I{N(R), R}                   (4) 
where I stands for input use intensity, and the rest are as defined in (1) above. 





< 0                    (5) 
That is, intensity of input use is reduced by tenure insecurity. Assuming that 
equation (2) above holds, farm households with larger per capita land holdings feel more 
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That is, intensity of farm input use is inversely related to per capita farm size. 
This effect may appear in cross section data when factor markets are imperfect and is in 
line with the finding of an inverse relationship between farm size and land productivity 
that derives from more intensive use of labor on small farms. If equations (2) and (7) 
above hold, then the inverse relationship may be caused by a combination of tenure 
insecurity and land scarcity factors. If (2) does not hold but (7) does, then the inverse 
relationship is caused purely by the land scarcity/population pressure effect.  
Specifically, we assert that: 
•  Land scarcity (population pressure on land) is the main determinant of intensity of 




have larger farm input intensity than households with a larger relative farm size. 
This may lead to the frequently found inverse relationship between yields and 
farm size (Heltberg 1998). The question is whether this relationship holds within 
smallholder agriculture in Ethiopia. 
•  Poverty and subsistence constraints may undermine the ability of households to 
purchase farm inputs. These constraints are likely to be more binding on relatively 
small farms than on relatively large farms. This may imply that the probability 
and level of use of purchased farm inputs will increase with farm size. 
•  If tenure insecurity affects farm input intensity negatively, we expect the level of 
farm input intensity to be lower in communities where equation (2) holds (have a 
positive correlation between farm size and tenure insecurity). A dummy variable 
(DI) is included for communities with a positive correlation between relative farm 
size and tenure insecurity. A negative sign may indicate that the redistribution 
policy has resulted in lower intensity of use of purchased farm inputs in areas 
where it has been most efficient. A positive sign may indicate that the 
redistribution policy has had a positive effect on intensity of use of purchased 
farm inputs. The latter may arise because of more equal access to inputs. 
•  In communities where equation (2) holds we expect a more negative relationship 
between relative farm size and farm input intensity. Including the interaction 
variable DI*R tests this. 
•  We expect that households with larger own land/operated land ratio (Aratio ) have 
higher farm input intensity for two reasons: a. For those renting in land, the 




will use less inputs on sharecropped land than on own land
10. b. For those renting 
out land, this practice may  allow intensification on own operated land and give a 
similar result when factor markets are imperfect. The option of renting out land 
may allow them to concentrate purchased inputs on a smaller area of land
11. 
Households renting out part of their land (Aratio>1) may feel less tenure secure 
overall (Hypothesis 3), although they may also feel more tenure secure for the 
land they are operating and for which input intensity is measured.  
•  Other inputs in farming (labor and oxen for plowing) may be complements or 
substitutes to purchased farm inputs. Imperfections in the markets for these inputs 
make the household endowments of these to be a good indicator of access.  
•  Market access may also affect use of purchased farm inputs. Distance to market 
and transportation technologies are used as indicators of market access. Education 
could also influence access to off-farm employment
12. Off-farm income was left 
out as it was considered endogenous and dependent on other RHS variables and 
no good additional instruments were available for its prediction. 
 Finally, a number of household characteristics may influence production 
decisions as these are non-separable from consumption decisions when markets are 
imperfect. Empirically, we model farm input intensity among farm households in 
Southern Ethiopia as: 
                                                 
10 A large proportion of land renting in the area is in the form of sharecropping. The Marshallian effect is 
only relevant when the own to operated land ratio is less than one. 
11 Lack of oxen and inability to rent in oxen is an important reason why land is rented out. 
12 Off-farm income could serve to relax the cash constraint and therefore contribute to more purchase of 
farm inputs but it could also have the opposite effect because access to off-farm income reduces interest in 
and capacity to farm intensively. Off-farm income was negatively associated with farm size, livestock 




I = I {R, Aratio, Ml, Fl, TLU, Ox, Mrktd, tI , N, DI, DI*R, DS, Z
h} (8) 
where the amount of purchased farm inputs (I) is a function of relative farm size (R), ratio 
of own land to total operated land (Aratio), male labor force (Ml), female labor force (Fl), 
livestock holding (TLU), oxen (Ox)
13,  market distance (Mrktd), transportation 
technology dummies (ti), perception of tenure insecurity (N)
14, dummy (DI) for 
communities where larger relative farm size is related to more tenure insecurity, 
interaction term (DI*R) giving the relative farm size in DI communities, site or farming 
systems dummies (DS), and household characteristics (Z
h). The expected signs of the 
variables are; R (-), Aratio (+), Ml(+/-), Fl(+/-), TLU (+), Ox (+), Mrktd (-), ti (+), N (-), 
DI(-), DI*R(-), DS (+/-), Z
h (+/-). The input and stock variables are per unit of operated 
land. 
We would expect a similar effect on investment in perennials as on input 
intensity. The direction of causality is more uncertain when it comes to planting of 
perennials, however. Perennials were also planted in only six of the 15 sites. We analyzed 
what factors were correlated with the decision to have perennials or not. The same factors 
as above were included as RHS variables. 
 
3.  STUDY AREA AND DATA 
The study was carried out in 1997-98 in 15 different sites in Southern Ethiopia. 
The sites (clusters) were selected such that the major agro-ecological, cropping practices, 
                                                 
13 Livestock holding and oxen holding were not so closely correlated that it created a multicollinearity 
problem. 




market access and demographic variations in the region were included. The survey 
included a sample of 505 farm households (30 to 35 households randomly selected from 
each site) that were interviewed using a formal questionnaire. The major variables used in 
the analysis are presented in Table 1. We see that 17% of the households stated that they 
were tenure insecure. The shares of households in each site that were feeling tenure 
insecure are presented behind each site dummy in Table 1. There was considerable 
variation in this percentage across sites (from zero to 66%). More detailed information on 
each site is provided in Appendix 1. The sites were also divided in six farming systems, 
D1 to D6, and this grouping was used in some models. A brief description of the farming 





Table 1--Overview and Definition of Variables  
Variable     Description  Mean  Std. Dev.  
Tenurepr  (N)  1=tenure insecure, 0= tenure secure  0.17  - 
Hhsize  Number of persons in the household  7.67  3.253 
Hhage  Age of the head of the household   44.73  0.620 
Hhhsex  Sex of household head; male=1, female=0  0.95  - 
Educ16th  Household members with education up to grade 6   2.20  0.087 
Educ6th  Household members with education above grade 6  0.57  0.046 
Totland  Total owned farm land holding (in Timad)  6.35  5.21 
Relar  (R)  Relative farm size in community  0.95  0.89 
Rentoutd (DRO)  Dummy for renting out land  0.08   
Ownoprat 
(Aratio) 
Ratio of own land to operational land holding  0.93  0.40 
Perenla  (Aens)  Share of land covered with perennials  0.31  0.68 
TLUop    Livestock (in tropical livestock units) per 
operational holding (op) size  
0.95  0.877 
Oxenop  (Ox)  Oxen holding per op size  0.21  0.242 
Equinop  Total Equine holding (head count) per op size  0.09  0.160 
Mlabop  (Ml)  Male labor units of the household per op size  0.57  0.633 
Flabop  (Fl)  Female labor units of the household per op size  0.53  0.585 
Dvarname  Dummy variable: 1=do not own variable, 0= 
otherwise 
   
lnvarname  Logarithmic transformed variable, lnvarname=0 if 
dvarname=1 
   
Mrktdist  
(Mrktd) 
Distance of market (in minutes required to reach it)  80.22  72.076 
Pinpop  Value of purchased inputs per op size (in birr)  50.03  67.41 
Site1   dummy = 1 if Damot Waja-kero (Sodo area, 
Wollaita) 
0.06   
Site2  dummy var. = 1 if Elka (Abosa area, Zway)  0.06   
Site3  dummy var. = 1if Kersa Ilala (Kuyera area, Arsi 
Neghele)  
0.18   
Site4  dummy var. = 1 if Woyo Medhane-Alem (Arsi 
Neghele) 
0.13   
Site5  dummy var. = 1 if Chefasine (Tula area, Sidamo)  0.00   
Site6  dummy var. = 1 if Chuko (Wondo Genet area, 
Sidamo) 
0.03   
Site7  dummy var. = 1 if Beche (Mareko area, Guraghe 
Zone) 
0.03   
Site8  dummy var. = 1 if Koka Neghewo (Koka area, 
Modjo) 
0.09   
Site9  dummy var. = 1 if Dekabora (Edjersa area, Modjo)   0.37   
Site10  dummy var. = 1 if Woyo-Gabriel (Meki)  0.00   
Site11  dummy var. = 1 if Dobi Gogot (Butajira area, 
Guraghe) 
0.66   
Site12  dummy var. = 1 if Amburse (Shone area, Hadiya 
Zone) 
0.47   
Site13  dummy var. = 1 if Abota Olto (Boditi area, 
Wollaita) 




Site14  dummy var. = 1 if Ghedeba (Alaba)  0.29   
Site15  dummy var. = 1 if Hidi (Debre Zeit) - Reference site  0.14   
siRela  Site-specific relative farm size,   i =1-15     
D1-D6  Farming System Groups, see Appendix 2     
Trans1  Dummy var.=1 if walking - Reference transport     
Trans2  Dummy var.=1 if using public transport     
Trans3   Dummy var.=1 if using horse cart     
Trans4  Dummy var.=1 if partly public transport &  partly 
walking 
   
Dinsec (DI)  Dinsec=1 in communities with positive N*R, 
Dinsec= 0 otherwise 
   
Relinsec 
(DI*R) 
Relative farm size in communities with positive 
N*R 
   
Site1 – site 15 mean values in the table are % feeling tenure insecure in the sample. 
 
To control for the differences in agro-ecological conditions, cropping practices, 
population pressure, market access, and prices of purchased inputs between the sites, we 
have included dummy variables for the 15 sites with one site (Site 15) serving as a 
reference site. The reference site is Hidi (Debre-Zeit area), a high potential cereal (small 
grains) -livestock zone with relatively good market access. Likewise, for the 
transportation technology we have 4 dummies, namely walking (Trans1), using public 
transport (Trans2), using horse/donkey cart (Trans3), and partly walking partly public 
transport (Trans4), and the reference is Trans1. We have also included a variable, equines 
(donkeys, horses and mules), that represents the major transportation animals in Ethiopia. 
 
4.  ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION 
Estimation of Tenure Insecurity Model 
The perception of tenure insecurity and the factors affecting it can be modeled as, 
N = b¢x + e                    (9) 
 
where N=1 if the household feels tenure insecure, and N=0 otherwise, x is an array of 




parameters, and e a vector of error terms.  Assuming that the disturbances are normally 
distributed, the probability of N = 1 (which expresses tenure insecurity here) can then be 
specified as a Probit model, 
Prob(N =1) = F(b¢x)                 (10) 
We estimated a maximum likelihood Probit model with robust (White/sandwich) 
estimation, correcting for cluster sampling and heteroskedasticity.  
Estimation of the farm input intensity model  
The intensity of production may be specified as a selection model as a sizeable 
number of households (57 households) used no purchased farm inputs and because other 
factors may affect use/no use (self-selection or rationing) and cause selection bias 
(Heckman 1990); 
I0i = x’ib+u0i                     (11) 
with the “switching” equation 
di = 1(zi’g+u1i>0)                  (12) 
which is equal to one when its statement is true and zero otherwise. The conditional 
estimation for those using purchased farm inputs then becomes; 
E(I|xI,,zI,II>0) = x’ib + l( zi’g)              (13) 
where 
l( zi’g) = E(u0i| u1i‡ - zi’g)              (14) 
We used both a Heckman model, which depends on the assumption that the error 
terms are normally distributed and is sensitive to heteroskedasticity, and an approach 
suggested by Deaton (1997). A Probit model was first run to predict the probability of a 




herbicides. Following Deaton’s approach, the predicted probabilities of using purchased 
inputs were incorporated in polynomial form (of third degree) in the censored regression 
estimation. The polynomials play a role similar to that of the inverse Mills’ ratio, but the 
normality assumption for the distribution of the error terms is relaxed (Deaton 1997).  
We tested the linear model for heteroskedasticity, using Cook and Weisberg 
(1983) tests,  and found it to be significant
15. By transforming to log-log form the 
problem was reduced but not eliminated. These two approaches revealed no significant 
selection bias. We therefore present only the results of the least squares (efficient but 
inconsistent) model. standard errors in the model were corrected for heteroskedasticity by 
using the conservative heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix (W) (HCCME), 
called HC3 (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993). This method has performed very well in 
Monte Carlo experiments and is considered better than the White/sandwich method 
(Davidson and MacKinnon 1993).  
As a third robust estimation approach, we used Powell’s censored least absolute 
deviations (CLAD) estimator (Powell 1984). It provides consistent parameter estimates 
and is considered a desirable alternative due to its robustness to conditional 
heteroskedasticity and distributional misspecification of the error term (Chen and Khan 
2000). The model may be specified as follows; 
I0i =1( x’ib+u0i)=max(0, x’ib+u0i)             (15)   
We take the median conditional on x to get; 
q50(I0i‰xi)=max(0,xi’b)              (16)   
                                                 





where q50(I0i‰xi ) denotes the median of the distribution conditional on xi and the median 
of u0i is assumed to be 0.  b can be consistently estimated by the parameter vector that 
minimizes; 
￿|I0i - max(0,xi’b)|                (17) 
Knowledge of the distribution is not required for consistency, and 
homoskedasticity is not assumed. Median regressions are used repeatedly, first on the 
total sample and later on a truncated sample. Each time observations with negative 
predicted values are eliminated, till convergence. Standard errors are finally estimated 
through bootstrapping. This approach tends to create larger variances (less efficient) than 
least squares methods and a fairly large sample size may be required. We present the 
results of the efficient least squares model and the consistent but less efficient CLAD 
model. 
Maximum likelihood probit models were used to assess the factors correlated with 
planting of perennial crops, correcting standard errors for cluster design and 
heteroskedasticity.  
 
5.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Tenure Insecurity Model 
The results of maximum likelihood Probit estimation of the tenure insecurity 
model are presented in Table 2. We first discuss the results of the general model (without 
site-specific effects) and afterwards the results of the model with site-specific effects. 
For the general model we see that relative farm size was not significant but the 




significant at 10% level, indicating that households renting out land feel less tenure 
secure as we hypothesized. Enset area share (a perennial crop) was significant and had 
the expected negative sign pointing in the direction of our initial hypothesis that 
perennials may reduce tenure insecurity. None of the household characteristics variables 




Table 2--Probit Estimates of Tenure Insecurity with Site-Specific Tests 
  General Model     Model with Site-Specific Effects 
Variables
2)   Coef.  P>|z|
1)  Coef.  P>|z|
1) 
hhhage  0.000965  0.881  0.0027236    0.689     
hhhsex   0.199077    0.466  0.2079233    0.445 
educ16th    -0.0109675   0.730  -0.0183129    0.587   
educ6th    0.1322191    0.131  0.1443961    0.191   
nettlu    0.0337248    0.177  0.0406668    0.113 
noofoxen    -0.0048299    0.961  -0.0366238    0.723   
relar    0.2426061    0.118     
rentoutd   0.5656099    0.084  0.601858    0.087   
ensetare    -0.3195928  0.094  -0.4474695    0.045   
site1     -0.5107306  0.069  -0.9180668    0.001   
site2     -0.6957648  0.001  -1.063443   0.002   
site3     -0.0340123  0.894  -1.24525    0.000   
site4    -0.1059916  0.638  0.0697507    0.861   
site6     -1.095049  0.003  -44.93096   0.000         
site7                   -0.8095587  0.002  -29.71774        
site8                    -0.587644  0.027    -1.746506    0.000   
site9                  0.8238848   0.000    0.5615941    0.001   
site11                 1.474776    0.000    0.850053    0.020   
site12                 1.060046    0.000    0.43746      0.180   
site13                   -0.161268  0.511    -1.209769    0.000   
site14                0.5010155    0.002    0.6674109    0.000   
s1rela      -0.2030949    0.001   
s2rela        -0.2556591    0.103   
s3rela       0.5184294  0.000   
s4rela       -0.8167302    0.000   
s6rela       22.51113  0.000 
s7rela      11.61947                  . 
s8rela         0.4520611    0.000   
s9rela         -0.3049232    0.042   
s11rela         -0.026962    0.767   
s12rela         0.0261532    0.763   
s13rela      0.4103383    0.000   
s14rela        -0.83263      0.000   
s15rela       -0.5666284    0.000 
Constant            -1.669797    0.000        -0.8429551    0.086   
Number of obs.        436    436           
Log likelihood        -168.51925     -156.70697           
Pseudo R2               0.2216    0.2762             
                 66 failures and 2 success       
            completely determined   
1)  Based on standard errors corrected for cluster design and heteroskedasticity.
 
2)  site5 and site10 predicted tenure insecurity perfectly, site5Rela   





The model with site-specific effects provides a more careful test of Hypotheses 1 
and 2 in each site. In four of the sites (site3, site6, site8, site13), relative farm size was 
significantly and positively correlated with tenure insecurity, while in five other sites 
(site1, site4, site9, site14 and site15) it was significantly negatively associated with tenure 
insecurity. These variations could have arisen due to local historical, cultural, and 
demographic differences, which could give way to differences in the importance of local 
power structure and influence to counteract the tenure insecurity felt by the more land-
rich households due to the past land redistribution policy. The area of perennials was 
significant at 5% level with a negative sign as we expected and the land renting dummy 
was significant at 10% level and with a positive sign consistent with our hypothesis and 
the model without site-specific effects. 
Even though there is local variation as to how the land redistribution policy has 
affected tenure insecurity, it is possible that the policy has had a negative effect on input 
intensity in areas where it has contributed to tenure insecurity. We test this in the next 
section. 
Farm Input Intensity 
We present the results of the purchased farm input intensity models in Tables 3 
and 4.  
Table 3 presents the results for the first stage probit model on the decision to use 
purchased farm inputs or not. Model 1 in the table includes site dummies (fixed effects) 
while Model 2 divides sites in farming systems groups and has dummies for these 
instead. Some sites were eliminated in Model 1 because they predicted perfectly.  Use of 




observations in the analysis (496 instead of 326, see Table 3). It also allowed us to 
include a dummy for the sites with positive N*R relationship to test whether the 
redistribution policy has had an effect on the probability of using purchased farm inputs.  
Table 3--Probit Model: To Purchase or not to Purchase Farm Inputs 
                   Model 1                    Model 2 
Variables
                                 Coef.  P>|z|                     Coef.  P>|z|  
hhhage               -0.0058846    0.440       -0.0139778  0.037     
hhhsex                  0.0444259    0.878      0.2905118  0.208     
educ16th               0.1751252    0.022       0.1183238  0.025     
educ6th               -0.0189476    0.642      -0.0894163  0.104     
lnmlabop                  -0.3223805  0.101      -0.0536098  0.712     
lnflabop                 0.1060128    0.620      0.075352  0.659     
lntluop                     -0.036476  0.834      -0.0639398    0.689     
lnoxenop              -0.3891096    0.169  -0.3302514    0.161     
lnequinop               -0.2131252  0.379  -0.3294842    0.128     
doxenop                 0.118199      0.734      0.0058488    0.983     
dtluop                   1.169605      0.068      0.855782      0.149     
dequinop                0.1202793    0.711      0.1127248    0.723     
relar                      1.228777    0.013       1.224742      0.000     
ownoprat              -0.0537858    0.747      -0.2168751    0.304     
mrktdist                  -0.0012664  0.002      0.0004461    0.750     
trans2                  -0.9694509    0.000      0.3813082    0.215     
trans3                    0.033434      0.053      -0.0999076    0.208     
trans4                   -0.1385082   0.000      -0.0496163    0.317     
tenurepr     -0.1017202    0.791      -0.2279833    0.403     
relinsec     -0.6945446    0.106      -0.6131247    0.063     
dinsec        0.001     
site1     -0.4569763    0.454         
site2     -2.237816      0.000           
site5     -1.233713      0.040         
site6     -0.4274397    0.622         
site7     -1.768967      0.000         
site8     -0.1530245    0.884         
site11      0.3425019    0.438         
site12     -1.340581      0.000         
site13     -0.4719348    0.424         
D1      0.430902      0.599     
D2      -1.206355  0.149     
D3      -1.307679  0.038     
D4      -1.119711  0.108     
D5      0.2748034    0.617     
Constant     0.6108492    0.250          0.6452675    0.473     
Number of obs         326    496       
Log likelihood    -103.07074                          -115.13263                 




The results in both models indicate that tenure insecurity had no direct effect on 
whether households purchased farm inputs or not. Model 2 indicates that households 
were more likely to buy farm inputs in the sites with positive tenure insecurity – relative 
farm size relationship, indicating that the land redistribution policy may actually have had 
a positive impact on input intensity. This is contrary to the hypothesis that land 
redistribution has had a negative effect on input use. Overall, households with relative 
larger farm sizes were more likely to buy farm inputs (significant at 1 and 5% levels in 
Models 1 and 2). This is contrary to the Boserup-hypothesis. Local power structures, but 
also subsistence constraints and poverty, may undermine the Boserup-effect. Ability to 
produce a surplus for sale may be a necessary condition for purchasing farm inputs. The 
effect of the relative farm size was less pronounced in the areas with a positive 
insecurity-farm size relationship, however. This may indicate that the redistribution 
policy has contributed to improved access to purchased farm inputs among the land-poor 
households in these sites, which may in turn be because the poor have been more 
empowered in these sites. 
We see that the market distance and the transportation method variables were 
significant in Model 1. Households far from the market were less likely to purchase farm 
inputs (1% level of significance), households using horse/donkey carts were more likely 
to use purchased farm inputs (Trans3 variable – 10% level of significance) and 
households (partly) using public transport (Trans2 and Trans4 variables – both 1% level 
of significance) were less likely to purchase farm inputs.  In Table 4 we present the 
results of the (efficient but inconsistent) least squares model and the consistent CLAD 
model for the determinants of the level of use of purchased farm inputs. 
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Table 4--Determinants of Intensity of Use of Purchased Farm Inputs 
  Robust Least Squares  Powell’s CLAD 
                           
Variables
                                
Coef.  P>|t|
1)  Coef.  P>|t|
2)  
hhhage     -0.0176186   0.001    -0.0198778    0.006    
hhhsex      0.4609013   0.085    0.3974978  0.308    
educ16th     -0.0591137   0.066    -0.0028694    0.943    
educ6th      0.0282797   0.642    -0.0337115    0.695    
lnmlabop      0.3104104   0.029    0.1178655    0.580    
lnflabop      0.3992296   0.005    0.293017    0.139    
lntluop     -0.0958011   0.321    -0.0777087    0.653    
lnoxenop      0.2010084   0.160    0.2353789    0.241    
lnequinop      0.1674306   0.204    0.3644573    0.045    
dmlabop     -0.4836847   0.820    -1.77685      0.041    
doxenop     -0.6491631   0.017    -0.7867253    0.041    
dtluop      0.2670351   0.441    0.5698135    0.298    
dequinop     -0.4517774   0.147    -0.7867507    0.063    
relar      0.0405859   0.845    0.2042746    0.548    
ownoprat      0.1573518   0.329    0.109441    0.655    
mrktdist      0.0014707   0.252    0.0013255  0.498    
      trans2      0.0714059   0.738    -0.0621111    0.832    
      trans3     -0.1785096   0.254    -0.0951884    0.625    
      trans4      0.011755    0.884    -0.0398823    0.744    
    tenurepr      0.0570637   0.697    0.0746567    0.695    
    relinsec     -0.0572131   0.775    -0.2127527    0.529    
      dinsec     -0.2003667   0.641    0.3628588    0.596    
       site1     -1.187289    0.011    -0.5656832    0.412    
       site2     -2.276443    0.000    (dropped)     
       site3     -0.3108558   0.334    -0.3425306    0.462    
       site4     -0.8029462   0.032    -0.5255961    0.338    
       site5     -1.194331    0.020    -1.388324    0.145    
       site6     -0.9205846   0.110    -0.8610676    0.271    
       site7     -1.589776    0.000    -1.96156      0.034    
       site8     -0.4163927   0.353    -0.6403366    0.376    
       site9     (dropped)      (dropped)   
      site10     -2.064292    0.000    -1.483293    0.061    
      site11     -0.5757453   0.216    -0.578154    0.449    
      site12     -0.9615148   0.005    -0.7733252    0.116    
      site13     -1.065599    0.020    -0.7159062    0.277    
      site14     -0.9355083   0.018    -1.106632    0.083    
       _cons      4.268178    0.000    3.982303    0.000    
Number of obs     445    432      
F( 35,409)       13.62       
Prob > F          0.0000       
R-squared         0.4767    Pseudo R2      0.1683 
Cook-Weisberg                  test                    for                      Bootstrap replications   
heterosked.                                                 1000 
Ho: Constant variance 
chi2(1)      =                             4.33 
Prob > chi2  =      0.0375 
1) Based on robust HC3 standard errors   




The tenure insecurity variable was insignificant and with a positive sign. There is 
therefore no apparent negative direct effect of tenure insecurity on intensity of use of 
purchased farm inputs. The relative farm size variable was insignificant and had a 
positive sign. We therefore see no Boserup effect in relation to the extent of use of 
purchased farm inputs within the communities. Furthermore, the Dinsec (DI) and 
Relinsec (DI*R) variables were insignificant as well. The ratio of own land to total 
operated land holding was also insignificant. We therefore found no significant 
inefficiency spilling over to the use of purchased farm inputs due to the share-tenancy 
arrangement (Marshallian inefficiency), or due to rented in land serving as a substitute for 
intensification on own land for those renting in land.  
Households with older household heads were found to use less purchased inputs 
(1% level of significance). Many of the site dummies were significant and all with a 
negative sign, indicating that there was significantly higher purchased farm input use in 
the reference site (Hidi, Debre Zeit area) than in the rest of the sites. Some other variables 
were significant in the (efficient) least squares model but not in the (consistent but less 
efficient) CLAD model. We do not discuss these variables, as they are unimportant to the 
objectives of the paper.  
Planting of perennials 
The results of the probit models for factors correlated with the growing of 
perennial crops are presented in Table 5. In the model without site-specific farm size 
effects we find that the decision to plant perennials is highly dependent on the farming 
system favored in the different locations. The analysis could therefore be carried out only 
for the sites where some but not all households planted perennial crops. In these sites we 
could inspect what factors were correlated with the decision to plant perennials and  
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whether the tenure insecurity variable had a significant impact on this. Table 5 shows that 




Table 5—Probit Model for Growing of Perennial Crops 
  General Model  Model with site-specific effects 
Variables
                               Coef.  P>|z|        Coef.  P>|z| 
hhhage     -0.006449    0.722       0.020538    0.310   
hhhsexm1      0.0585258    0.843       0.252264    0.358   
educ16th      0.1835886    0.000       0.145207    0.000   
educ6th       0.0219591    -0.841     0.021791    0.873   
lnmlabop         0.4885521  0.021      -0.089986    0.573   
lnflabop      0.4370763    0.000       0.053994    0.788   
lntluop      0.6324539    0.003       0.419357    0.081   
lnoxenop      0.5074121    0.004       0.344251    0.018   
lnequinop         -1.431021  0.077      -1.497181    0.107   
doxenop        -1.139253  0.070      -0.730739    0.068   
dtluop      6.980979      .    38.25907      0.000   
dequinop          1.601279  0.069       1.652406    0.169   
relar      1.581229    0.004     
ownoprat        -0.8163459  0.001       0.123875    0.791   
mrktdist         0.0012739  0.771       0.001933    0.671   
trans2        -0.6890541  0.083      -1.165845    0.001   
tenurepr        -0.1856045  0.756      -0.123228    0.855   
site1           8.82572  0.000      61.58649      0.000   
site7      0.4059959    .     
site12      6.755984    0.000      59.53498      0.000   
site13      5.437478    0.000      59.78863      0.000   
s1rela            1.65663      0.000   
s7rela           26.94277      0.000   
s12rela            0.91161      0.016   
Constant        -8.304353  0.000     -63.49886       . 
Log likelihood                           -39.283546                                            -39.876033 
                            
Pseudo R2                                    0.6357                                                    0.5677 
Number of obs                         167                                                         135 
63 failures and 0 successes                                                      30 failures and 0 successes 
completely determined                                                             completely determined 
 











This is contrary to the Boserup-hypothesis that land scarcity will stimulate 
investment. Some perennials, like cash crops, may be grown more by the wealthier 
households with better market access. Poverty and subsistence constraints (food 
insecurity) may prevent small farmers from investing in cash crops. The tenure insecurity 
variable was insignificant. We therefore see no significant negative effect of the 
redistribution policy such that large farms are less likely to plant perennials or that tenure 
insecurity is directly negatively correlated with planting of perennials.  
Planting of perennials was found to be significantly and positively correlated with 
relative farm size, oxen ownership, livestock wealth, male and female labor force and 
basic education. Resource poverty, and not tenure insecurity, may therefore be the main 
reason for failure to invest in perennials. 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
We have assessed the impact of the land redistribution policy on tenure insecurity 
in Southern Ethiopia, and how this may affect the intensity of production, measured in 
form of purchased farm inputs. Overall, we may conclude that there is some tenure 
insecurity problem in the region as about 17% of the households stated that they were 
afraid that they may lose land due to possible future land redistributions. There was 
considerable variation in feeling of tenure insecurity across sites.  
In the tenure insecurity model, we had set out to test Alemu’s (1999) hypothesis 
that per capita farm size is directly related to tenure insecurity. When we made an 
undifferentiated test for the whole sample, we found that per capita farm size was 
insignificantly correlated with tenure insecurity. In the site-specific test, however, we 
found a significant positive correlation in four of the 15 sites, while the opposite sign was  
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statistically significant in five other sites. Local historical, cultural, and demographic 
differences could have resulted in differences in local power structure’s capacity to 
influence the implementation and enforcement of the redistribution policy, thereby 
shaping the distribution of tenure security. Site-specific studies would enable a more 
profound understanding of the factors affecting tenure insecurity. 
Households renting out land felt more tenure insecure. Ability to cultivate the 
land you have received may therefore be important for the feeling of tenure security.  
In the purchased farm input intensity model, tenure insecurity was not 
significantly affecting farm input intensity. This is according to our basic hypothesis that 
tenure insecurity has little or no impact on short-term production decisions. There is 
therefore no evidence of a negative effect from the land redistribution policy on input 
intensity through increased tenure insecurity. The effects through the rental market for 
land were also insignificant.  
Larger farms were more likely to purchase farm inputs and this indicates that 
poverty and subsistence constraints may undermine the ability to intensify production 
through purchase of farm inputs. This may explain the lack of Boserup-effects in the 
areas studied.  
Resource poverty; in land, male and female labor, oxen and basic education; were 
correlated with no investment in perennials while tenure insecurity was not significantly 
correlated with the decision to plant perennials. This is contrary to our basic hypothesis 
that tenure insecurity may affect long-term production decisions negatively. However, we 
do not know how the current feeling of tenure security relates to the feeling of tenure 
security in the past when the decisions to plant perennials were made. It appears that 
resource poverty rather than tenure insecurity may have undermined investment in  
 
33
perennials and purchase of farm inputs in the study areas. Alternatively, planting of 
perennials may also have been a strategy to secure land rights by the wealthier 
households. If there are any effects of the land redistribution policy, these are  
•  that it has improved the access to purchased farm inputs among all households in 
the areas where the policy has caused a significant positive correlation between 
relative farm size and tenure insecurity, and particularly so for the most land-poor 
households, 
•  that it has stimulated the more wealthy households to plant more perennials to 




Appendix 1--Some Information on the Survey Sites (averages).  
 
Survey Sites













        Foodcrp  Cashcrp     
Damot Waja-K.(Wollaita)    1  D1  6.88  2.06  0.09  2.84  0.50 
Abota-Olto (Boditi)             2  D1  8.49  2.03  0.00  2.75  0.83 
Amburse (Shone)              3  D1  8.41  4.03  0.06  4.60  1.03 
Chefasine (Sidamo)           4  D2  7.59  1.20  0.61  3.93  0.09 
Chuko (Wondo Genet)       5  D2  9.77  2.26  1.24  5.15  0.37 
Dobi-Gogot (Butajira)         6  D2  7.69  3.60  0.07  4.15  0.86 
Elka (Zway)                       7  D3  7.53  10.72  0.27  7.3  1.78 
Woyo-Gebriel (Meki)          8  D3  6.66  13.06  0.37  5.11  1.94 
Beche (Mareko)                 9  D4  7.44  2.26  1.02  2.34  0.76 
Gedeba (Alaba)                 10  D4  6.97  5.84  1.46  5.68  1.69 
Kersa-Ilala(Arsi-Neghele)   11  D5  7.85  6.55  0.02  4.54  1.12 
Woyo Medhane A.             12  D5  9.37  7.30  0.72  4.92  1.27 
Koka-Neghewo (Koka)      13  D6  6.57  9.72  2.73  6.33  1.37 
Dekabora (Modjo)               14  D6  7.37  9.88  0.13  4.75  2.83 
Hidi (Debre Zeit)                  15  D6  6.71  9.00  0.00  6.45  3.14 
Over All Average      7.67  5.98  0.59  4.72  1.31 
a HH = Household,    
c  TLU = Livestock in Tropical Livestock Units.  
b Timad is a local measure of land, equivalent to what an adult male can plough in a day using a pair of 
oxen; on the average it is approximately equal to 0.25 hectares of land. 
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the Farming 
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Kero 2.Abota Olto          
3.Amburse 
 
Very densely populated, enset
1)-maize-root crop producing 
areas with poor market access, and not much cash crop 
production.   
 




4.Chefasine              
5.Chuko                     
6.Dobi Gogot 
 
Densely populated, enset-maize-beans producing areas, with 
chat
2) and coffee produced as important cash crops.  
 




7.Elka                     
8.Woyo Gebriel 
 
Dry, less densely populated, maize-haricot beans producing 






9.Beche        
10.Gedeba 
 
Relatively dry, maize producing areas (with some teff
3)) with a 
lot of livestock. Chili pepper produced as a major cash crop. 
 





Alem               
12.Kersa Ilala 
 
Grain (wheat, barley, maize) producing areas with a good 
amount of livestock. Some amount of onions and potatoes 
produced as cash crop.  
 




13.Dekabora                  
14.Koka Neghewo         
15.Hidi 
 
High potential grain (teff, wheat, barley, pulses) producing 
areas with fairly large livestock holdings, and relatively good 
market access.  
1)  Enset (Ensete ventricosum) is a tall banana-like fibrous perennial plant cultivated in Southern Ethiopia 
whose pseudo stem and tuber are processed for food (see Mehtzun and Yewelsew 1994).      
2)  Chat (Catha edulis) is a perennial shrub whose leaves are chewed as a stimulant (see Debebe 1997). It is 
an important cash crop for some farmers in Southern and Eastern Ethiopia.  
3)  Teff (Eragrostis teff) is an annual grass-like food crop, with tiny grains, produced in the Ethiopian 
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